Research Forum

All welcome!

If you have difficulty accessing the eLearning site (https://elearning.uni-bayreuth.de/course/view.php?id=32952), please let us know (Patricia Rich / Paolo Galeazzi).

Winter 2025/26

• Oct. 21st 2025 I Alexander Dinges (HU Berlin) I Defeat as Defense. A Novel Account of Figleaves
  Abstract: Suppose someone makes a racist remark but prefaces it with „I’m not a racist, but …“ or later dismisses it as „locker
  room talk.“ These rhetorical maneuvers are now commonly known as figleaves: devious rhetorical devices that obscure
  otherwise apparent norm violations. Figleaves can be dangerous: they can normalize harmful speech and shield
  speakers from criticism. It is therefore important to find effective strategies to counter them. In this paper, we propose
  a new account of figleaves that lays the groundwork for such strategies. We argue that figleaves are a particular kind of
  defeater: they defeat evidence for norm violations by exploiting flawed background beliefs of the audience. This account
  not only accomodates a range of otherwise recalcitrant types and characterizations of figleaves, but also draws on
  well-understood epistemological categories.
  
  

• Nov 25th 2025 I Annette Zimmerman (U Bayreuth) I Democratizing AI: Why and How

• Dec. 16th 2025 I Dorothea Debus (FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg) I Skills of Mental Self-Regulation: On (Experiential) Openness, Wonder, and other Expansive Attitudes (such as Gratitude and Joy)

• Jan. 20th 2026 I Pascale Willemsen (U Zurich) I Metaethics between Theory and Practice

• Jan. 27th 2026 I Thomas Kroedel (UH Hamburg) I Causal Complications for Explainable AI

Preceding Talks

• July 15th I Kristina Musholt (Leipzig University) I Self-knowledge and epistemic injustice
  Abstract: This talk will offer a social-epistemic account of self-knowledge and examine whether and how self-knowledge is vulnerable to structural injustice. Drawing on work by Boyle (2024), McGeer (1996) and others, I treat (reflective) self-knowledge as a rationally active achievement; yet one that depends on interpersonal scaffolding and uptake. In this view, self-knowledge is not a Cartesian given, nor merely a private achievement. Rather, it is a socially scaffolded, cognitively vulnerable form of agency. Extending Victoria McGeer’s regulative picture and building on work on epistemic injustice (e.g. Fricker 2007; Polhaus 2012; Medina 2017), I will analyse the ‘mindshaping’ norms that scaffold self-interpretation and argue that these norms can both enable and impair agents’ epistemic agency. For example, gaps in collective interpretive resources can leave marginalized people unable to make sense of their own experiences (“hermeneutical injustice”). At the same time, standpoint epistemology posits that marginalized groups, by virtue of their social position, may perceive aspects of reality that privileged groups overlook. In analysing the effects of structural injustice on self-knowledge, I will focus specifically on the role of affect. Finally, I will briefly discuss the question of how impairments to self-knowledge can and should be addressed.

• July 8th I Melina Tsapos (Lund University) I What is Interesting about Conspiracy Theories
  Abstract: A central debate in conspiracy theory research concerns how to conceptualize conspiracy theories in a way that advances our understanding of the phenomena and those who believe in them. This debate remains unresolved, with researchers adopting widely different positions: while some argue for a purely descriptive understanding, others seem strongly committed to the view that conspiracy theories are, or can be shown to be, inherently irrational. This paper reconstructs the controversy, arguing that it stems from two distinct scholarly motives: to attain objective knowledge of the phenomena in question versus to defend beliefs and norms that are part of the researcher’s own cultural context. By examining the epistemological and methodological challenges in this field, I highlight how competing frameworks—normative cultural biases versus objective scientific inquiry—shape our understanding of rational belief. When cultural biases influence research, they risk narrowing its scope and undermining the development of a comprehensive understanding of conspiracy theories. Ultimately, even proponents of normative cultural approaches can acknowledge that such perspectives fail to capture the full complexity and significance of these phenomena.

• June 17th I Joint Talk I Hasko von Kriegstein (Toronto Metropolitan University) I Well-Being as Harmony
  Abstract: I sketch out a theory of well-being according to which well-being is constituted by harmony between mind and world. The notion of harmony I develop has three aspects. First there is non-accidental correspondence between mind and world in the sense that events in the world non-accidentally match the content of our mental states. Second there is positive orientation towards the world, meaning that we have pro-attitudes towards the world we find ourselves in. Third, there is fitting response to the world in the sense that we act, think, and feel in accordance with our reasons for acting, thinking, and feeling. Taken together these three aspects make up an ideal of being attuned to, or at home in, the world. Such harmony between mind and world constitutes well-being. Its opposite – being disoriented, ill-at-ease in, or hostile to the world – makes a life go poorly. And, as we shall see, many of the things that intuitively contribute to well-being are instantiating one or more of the three aspects of harmony.

• June 25th I Joint Talk I Gabriel Ahlfeldt (HU Berlin) I The Geography of Life: Evidence from Copenhagen (this talk will take place in S 61 (RW I))

• May 20th I Benjamin Lange (LMU Munich) I Epistemic Deference to AI
  Abstract: When should we defer to AI outputs over human expert judgment? Drawing on recent work in social epistemology, I motivate the idea that some AI systems qualify as Artificial Epistemic Authorities (AEAs) due to their demonstrated reliability and epistemic superiority. I then introduce AI Preemptionism, the view that AEA outputs should replace rather than supplement a user’s independent epistemic reasons. I show that classic objections to preemptionism – such as uncritical deference, epistemic entrenchment, and unhinging epistemic bases – apply in amplified form to AEAs, given their opacity, self-reinforcing authority, and lack of epistemic failure markers. Against this, I develop a more promising alternative: a total evidence view of AI deference. According to this view, AEA outputs should function as contributory reasons rather than outright replacements for a user’s independent epistemic considerations. This approach has three key advantages: (i) it mitigates expertise atrophy by keeping human users engaged, (ii) it provides an epistemic case for meaningful human oversight and control, and (iii) it explains the justified mistrust of AI when reliability conditions are unmet. While demanding in practice, this account offers a principled way to determine when AI deference is justified, particularly in high-stakes contexts requiring rigorous reliability.

• May 13th I Gemma Lligadas Gonzalez (Centre for Human Rights Erlangen-Nuremberg) I Inter-judicial Coordination as a Process of Norm-emergence: Courts' Collective Capacity as Trend-setters to Reshape the Global Order
  Abstract: During the last decades, the predominant state-centric analysis of international relations has been challenged by the unexpected irruption of courts as game-changing actors: national and international courts have become the unexpected pitfall of national governments’ international agendas. While international courts’ potential to be international political actors has been traditionally acknowledged, national courts have a newly acquired leverage by collectively contradicting their governments’ policies, even in areas traditionally reserved to the executive action and precluded from judicial review (such as international security or foreign affairs), and such power can reshape the international order. My article is devoted to elucidating courts’ collective potential as international political actors, this is as global trend-setters capable of changing the structural conditions for the international relations of states and international organizations, drawing from IR theory on norm-emergence. I posit that courts’ increased capacity as international political actors (“IPAs”) comes from inter-judicial coordination (“IJC”): a phenomenon in which courts from independent jurisdictions apply the same strategic approach to common rules in order to uphold a common stance regarding certain policies. In short, my argument is that, through ICJ, courts become international norm-entrepreneurs that create behavioral change in other IPAs and structural changes in the global order. According to my theory, this phenomenon requires a critical mass of norm-entrepreneurs that depends, first and foremost, on national courts’ enforcement powers. Furthermore, especially influential domestic courts can be seen as norm-enablers capable of creating partial cascade effects in the diffusion of the emerging political norm. For their part, international courts will act as norm- disablers that will halt the diffusion of a competing political standard when involved. From an empirical point of view, I test this theory by examinig the evolution of post-9/11 counterterrorism measures in order to track the creation of judicial trends, the matching structural changes in the global policymaking concerning this field, and IPAs behavioral change. Hence, my contribution is threefold: my work adds a measurable definition to the existing literature on IJC, it theorizes the mechanisms behind its dynamic process of norm-emergence, and it proves ICJ’s political effects and courts’ reach as IPAs when globally coordinated.

• May 6th I Johanna Bärnreuther (European Commission) I Shaping Europe’s Future: Between Competitiveness, Security and Debt Sustainability
  Abstract: As the second von der Leyen Commission assumes office, new priorities are taking centerstage. The Political Guidelines for the European Commission 2024-2029 aim to navigate an era of seismic change – for our society, security, planet and economy. In this talk, BA Philosophy & Economics alumna Johanna Bärnreuther will outline the Commission’s strategy to strengthen and unify Europe at this critical juncture. She will then explore how the new priorities intersect with her work in economic policy coordination and fiscal stability in the EU and examine the connections to policy developments in Germany.

• January 28th I Friederike Wall (Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt) I Hidden-Action Models from a Critical Rationalist Perspective
  Abstract: Hidden-action models are pivotal in contract theory and translate into designing incentive schemes in domains like Personnel Economics or Management Control. In the presentation, the hidden-action model is analyzed – in a "basic" version known from principal-agent theory and in an agentized version, i.e., transferred into agent-based simulation models. The paper presents four arguments with a particular focus on potential obstacles that impede active testing and learning: First, from optimization under constraints, the standard hidden-action model provides the optimal incentive structure, being extremely sensitive to the information about the agent's effort captured in the principal's result. In contrast, actual schemes appear much simpler and relatively uniform for various contingencies - suggesting a case of what Albert (1968, 2012) called "model platonism" as the immunization of a theory against experience and, thus, falsification. Second, agentized versions of the standard model (e.g., Leitner/Wall 2023) allow for capturing richer contingencies and contracting parties' bounded rationality and learning. The results of the agent-based simulations, however, suggest that under these conditions, the optimal solution of the standard model is hard to obtain. Third, the paper argues that with the transition to agent-based versions of the model, namely bounded rationality of contracting parties, new problems arise that limit the ability to justify the agent-based models' assumptions and results – and to derive falsifiable hypotheses. Fourth, the paper outlines that the justifiability of models with limited rational actors could be increased by integrating AI technologies and by Epstein's (2023) concept of "Inverse Generative Social Science".

• January 22th I Joint Talk I Vincent Merlin (Université de Caen) I Measuring power in French inter-municipal councils [Note that this talk will take place in room S 62 (RW)]

• January 14th I Marc Cheong (University of Melbourne) I "Do you come from a Land Down Under?" AI & digital ethics perspectives from the Antipodes

• November 26th I Joint Talk I Conrad Heilmann and Stefan Wintein (Erasmus University Rotterdam) I Objective Fairness Theories in Economics and Philosophy
  Abstract: Fairness is an important normative concept, central to theories in both philosophy and economics, as well as to moral theory and practice. We advance a methodological thesis about normative fairness research in philosophy and economics: these theories have established conceptual insight about fairness objectively – at least in some important ways and to some degree. We demonstrate that there is more to objectivity of fairness than meets the eye, in three ways: (i) there are important non-subjective theories of fairness in both economics and philosophy, (ii) the content of subjective fairness theories in both economics and philosophy is established more objectively than one might think, (iii) there is much intersubjective agreement between fairness researchers on both the subjective and non-subjective fairness research in both disciplines. More generally, our methodological thesis about normative fairness research in philosophy and economics reveals several important, and hitherto unacknowledged, parallels between the two disciplines. It is also contrary to the widely held opinion that fairness is a quintessentially subjective concept.

• November 5th I Roman Heil (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/M) I Epistemic Justification and Third Parties
  Abstract: Whether a belief is epistemically justified is widely considered to be an affair between the believer and the way they formed their belief. In this paper, I explore the view that the justificatory status of a belief is linked to what is appropriate for third parties to believe. In doing so, I will draw inspiration from debates in legal theory, where the view that legal justification is linked to the appropriateness of third-party conduct has been systematically worked out and widely codified. I will show that these legal debates are strikingly analog to recent discussions about the function of epistemic assessment, where it has been argued that there is a link between a belief’s being epistemically justified and the appropriateness of third-party deference to said belief (Dogramaci, 2012, 2015; Greco and Hedden, 2016). In this paper, I will spell out this link and argue that it provides us with a powerful explanation of our division of epistemic labour. However, I will also show that this explanatory proposal is threatened by cases of (what I call) deference conflicts. I will argue that the most promising response to these cases is to take a “civil law–style” approach and favour the view that epistemic justification is factive.

• October 22nd I Florian Boge (TU Dortmund) I Re-Assessing Machine Cognition in the Age of Deep Learning
  Abstract: How seriously should we take the “I” in AI? Do ChatGPT and co literally understand our prompts? This question has long puzzled philosophers and scientists alike, with verdicts ranging from outright enthusiasm to profound pessimism. In this lecture, I will re-address the issue from two vantage points. First, I will suggest that Searle’s classic “Chinese Room Argument” can be revived in the age of Deep Learning, but in ways quite different from those Searle himself envisioned. Combining a more careful approach to Deep Learning theory with a slight alteration of the original scenario I call “The Chinese Library”, I will show that, insofar as Searle’s arguments were applicable in the 1980s, they are still applicable today. Second, I will suggest a close connection between understanding and the possession of concepts and, based on evidence from the technical literature, suggest that we should not assume that present-day DNNs have concepts – and hence, that they do understand anything.

• July 9th I Alex Gregory (University of Southampton) I Take In Your Hen: How to Evaluate Hedonic Adaptation
  Abstract: Humans have a strong tendency to hedonically adapt to their circumstances, so that something that once brought joy eventually brings only indifference. Does this tendency guarantee a kind of failure on our part? Happiness, like other emotions, seems subject to evaluation in terms of its fittingness. But it’s not clear how hedonic adaptation could possibly maintain fittingness: it involves changing one’s level of happiness even if one’s circumstance stay the same. This paper mounts a tentative defence of hedonic adaptation against this concern. It does so by articulating a key difference between the scale of happiness and the scale of goodness, and shows how that difference guarantees an inability to perfectly track goods with our levels of happiness. Given this background constraint, hedonic adaptation may be the most appropriate way for our happiness to change over time, even if we thereby fall short of some more perfect ideal.

• July 2th I Anette Stimmer (University of St. Andrews) I Norm Contestation and Change in International Politics
  Abstract: My book project studies contestation over established international legal norms such as territorial integrity, due process rights and the prohibition of torture in the post-Cold War era. Legal ambiguities and tensions give rise to debate when international law is applied to concrete situations. What outcomes can such norm contestation have and what are their implications for norm strength? What influences the duration of norm contestation? I use insights from rhetoric to show that states can agree or disagree on both the norm frame (justification) and/or claim (action) when applying international law. Thus, norm contestation can have four different outcomes: norm clarification (frame and claim agreement), norm recognition (frame agreement/claim disagreement), norm neglect (frame disagreement/claim agreement) and norm impasse (frame and claim disagreement). These alternate endings have different effects on the clarity and strength of the contested norms, as well as on subsequent debate over them. States act strategically when interpreting norms, but social dynamics intervene in the process, and influence the outcome of contestation. Norms are collectively held standards of appropriate behaviour, and therefore the verdict of the international community over norm interpretations decides over whether they take hold and whose reputation will suffer. I find that the three elements of debate influence the duration and outcome of norm contestation: 1) audience reactions, that is, what kind of social support the contesting parties receive; 2) argumentation, or the ability to legitimate interpretations; and, 3) the characteristics of speakers – in particular, when delegation takes place, the ability of agents to legitimate their work with their output and identity. The book illustrates this theory with eight case studies. In the talk, I will focus on two of these case studies: the contestation over the Ombudsperson to the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council and the maritime boundary dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

• June 11 I Ophelia Deroy (LMU München) I The public-private distinction in the mind: How we draw it and why it matters
  Abstract: If you are on a bus engrossed in your phone, you recognize that the visual content on your screen remains private to you. Any sudden sound emanating from your device however becomes public to those nearby. But how, and where is drawn the difference between a public and a private observable or observed object? Are those two even the same? While  answering these questions, I want also to explain why absence of publicity and illusions of publicity matter to our understanding of some phenomena like polarisation and other social dynamics.

• May 14th I Marta Halina (University of Cambridge) I Intuitive Physics in Nonhuman Animals
  Abstract: Comparative psychologists have spent the last few decades examining whether nonhuman animals understand the physical world in a way that is similar to humans. Broadly, human intuitive physics is thought to include capacities such as knowing that solid objects continue to exist even when no longer perceived, that objects tend to fall unless prevented from doing so, and that objects do not pass through each other. In this talk, I introduce the empirical research program dedicated to investigating intuitive physics in nonhuman animals. I then show how current research in this area encounters problems of holistic and contrastive underdetermination. Finally, I propose a route forward: computational modelling combined with signature testing.

• January 30th I Ella Whiteley (University of Sheffield) I Attentional Objectification
  Abstract: This talk brings precision to a pervasive but under-theorised way in which objectification can occur: through attentional patterns alone. Further, it introduces particularly subtle forms of attention-based objectification, where the attentional pattern’s problems are revealed in its comparative nature. For instance, a person might listen to a woman’s conversational contributions, and so not ignore something meaningful about her, and yet find her figure comparatively more noticeable. Alternatively, a person might not fixate on the bodies of black men, and yet find their bodies comparatively more salient than the bodies of white men. Recognising these particularly elusive forms of objectification requires acknowledging that, in contrast with influential interpretations of objectification, one needn’t be reduced to a body, or to have one’s autonomy denied, to count as being objectified. Moreover, the subtlety of these forms of objectification grants them an insidious immunity from criticism, which results in distinctive harms for the victim.

• January 23rd 2024 I Viktoria Knoll (TU Dresden) I The Normativity of Gender Revisited <- Due to train strikes, this session must be moved online. We will meet in the following zoom room at the usual time: https://uni-bayreuth.zoom.us/j/4145888814?pwd=NnpzUXAyQllrMGc5MXExaWw0YmZLZz09

• January 16th 2024 I Gil Hersch (Virginia Tech - Kellog Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics) I Joint Talk: Weighting Waiting
  
  Abstract: Imagine a case in which there is some good that many people want, for example a refreshment at a kiosk. People know to line up and queue, wait their turn to place their order, based on the order in which they arrived. Now imagine that someone rashes in, yelling that their partner just fainted outside and is in dire need of some water. I assume most people would find it absurd if those already in the queue would insist that the person get in the queue just like everyone else. Whole we generally treat line cutting as reprehensible, we also recognize that there are times in which people's claim for a good override our entitlement to be served before them just because we were ahead of them in the queue. What is much less commonplace is the recognition that there exists a continuum between everyone receiving the good in the order in which thy join the queue, and some people having a sufficiently strong claim to justify their jumping to the front of the queue. Between these extremes of completely equal treatment and lexicographic priority to very strong claim, I propose a weighting system for queuing based on different claim strengths.

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